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Psychology and BAPCPA: Enhanced
Disclosure and Emotion
RichardL. Wiener, Michael Holtje, Ryan J. Winter, Jason A. Cantone, Susan
Block-Lieb, and Karen Gross

I. INTRODUCTION
In the last 25 years, non-business bankruptcy filings in the United States
increased at a steady rate from fewer than 300,000 petitions in 1980 to over
1.7 million in 2005.1 This upward trend is evidenced in Figure 1, which
shows the number of non-business filings from the mid 1990s through 2005,
the year that Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con2
sumer Protection Act of 2005 [hereinafter BAPCPA]. The increase in consumer filings pressured Congress during the 1990s and the early years of the
current decade to change the bankruptcy system, in part, in response to the
increase in the number of consumers defaulting on their loans and seeking
relief through the courts. With the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress did more
than re-write important aspects of federal consumer bankruptcy law: it also
enhanced disclosure requirements applicable to credit card issuers. Ostensibly, BAPCPA increased credit card disclosure requirements in reaction to two
problems: sustained increases in consumer credit - including credit card
credit - and in the consumer bankruptcy filing rate over the past 25 years.

1. (1)
U.S.
COURTS,
BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS
(2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#calendar (last visited Sept. 1,
2006).
2. (2) Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Figure 1: Number of non-business bankruptcy filings
by chapter and year
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Figure 1 suggests upward trends in Chapter 7 filings, which enable a
trustee to sell a debtor's unencumbered non-exempt assets and distribute the
proceeds to priority and general unsecured creditors. A successful conclusion
of this process results in a discharge, freeing the debtor from personal liability
on many, but not all, remaining pre-bankruptcy claims. Figure 1 also demonstrates steady increases in the number of Chapter 13 filings, which allow consumers to hold onto all of their property and instead repay their creditors
through a relatively long repayment plan (most likely five years) that exempts
disposable income that debtors need to support themselves and their dependents. This shows that while almost all consumer petitions are of the Chapter 7
or 13 type, some small percentage of consumers file Chapter 11 petitions that
follow a more complex and expensive restructuring process modeled after
small business default claims. Figure 1 shows data collected over time, which
depicts a general increase in the total number of consumer bankruptcy petitions filed during the 1990s where the rate of increase in Chapter 7 filings
3
lead the way, followed by a steady but slower growth in Chapter 13 filings.

3. Data from the last quarter of 2005 and the first two quarters of 2006 has led
to some informal discussion among bankruptcy scholars suggesting that there was an
increase in non-business filings within the months preceding the effective date of
BAPCPA and a decrease in the six months following enactment. Policy analysts continue to follow the trends, which may show a recent increase in non-business filings.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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What does any of this have to do with the psychology of BAPCPA?
This article describes a program of research that applies social analytic jurisprudence to test some of the assumptions in consumer bankruptcy law and
policy. 4 Our work first seeks to describe selected provisions from the newly
enacted bankruptcy amendments that pertain to enhanced disclosure requirements, and then to locate some of the behavioral assumptions implicit in these
provisions. 5 Next, we assess the accuracy of these assumptions based on an
experiment that we conducted looking at a simulated online shopping trip that
we constructed specifically to test the effects of enhanced disclosure.

II. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Social analytic jurisprudence makes three important assumptions about
the role of psychology in law and public policy. First, psychology as it relates
to law is an empirical science and psycholegal scholars conducting work in
this area constitute a scientific paradigm, which shares a common commitment to a set of scientific beliefs and values. 6 The result of the empirical studies of these scientists can shed needed light on the assumptions that the law
makes about human behavior and the findings can and should influence both
law and public policy. 7 Second, these psycholegal scholars apply the theory
4. Social analytic jurisprudence is a type of psychological jurisprudence, developed by Wiener in an earlier law review article. Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic
Jurisprudenceand Tort Law: Social Cognition Goes to Court, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.

503 (1993). Wiener, his students and colleagues have applied this approach to studying law and psychology to a variety of areas in the last 10 years. These areas include
judgments of workplace discrimination, specifically sexual harassment, see, e.g.,
Richard L. Wiener et al., The Effects of Prior Workplace Behavior on Subsequent
Sexual Harassment Judgments, 28 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 47 (2004); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Fit and Implementation of Sexual Harassment Law to Workplace
Evaluations,87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 747 (2002); Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt,
An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Understanding Social Sexual Conduct at Work, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 556 (1999); Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social
Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When It Is Harassmentand When It
Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1997), and decisions regarding juror use of the death
penalty in homicide cases, Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarativeand ProceduralKnowledge, 10 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 516 (2004).
5. See Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social
Analytic Jurisprudenceto Consumer Bankruptcy EducationRequirements and Policy,
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453 (2005), for a fuller development of the Social Analytic Perspective as applied to problems in the new bankruptcy rules that follow from BAPCP.
6. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 510. See, e.g., ROY
LACHMAN, JANET LACHMAN & EARL C. BUTrERFIELD, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND
INFORMATION PROCESSING (1979); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCINTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962).
7. Wiener, SocialAnalytic Jurisprudence,supra note 4, at 510.
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and the empiricism of science to produce empirical relationships that shed
light on specific issues of law and policy. 8 Legal psychologists operating out
of this model base their conclusions on their data and not on their shared social or political ideologies. Third, psycholegal scholars adopt the roles of
consultants and not advocates. 9 Psycholegal scholars refrain from the use of
research findings simply to support one side of a policy debate; instead, they
search findings for results that disconfirm their hypotheses. In this manner,
psycholegal scholars advance the science of psychological jurisprudence.
While we are not so naive as to suggest that psycholegal research is value
free, social analytic jurisprudence advocates a thorough search of research
findings to locate evidence that supports plausible rival explanations and alternative accounts of research results. Researchers who ignore alternative
interpretations for their work risk disconfirmation through peer review, which
encourages other scientists to test an author's conclusions with alternative
explanations.
Social analytic jurisprudence follows a three-stage process. It begins
with a careful analysis of the legal doctrine or policy rules and procedures to
determine psychological and behavioral assumptions that underlie the particular ascriptions and prohibitions, which contribute to policy in any given
area.' 0 Next, psycholegal researchers review the social science literature to
identify theories, research results, and methodologies that speak to the validity of these assumptions. 1 This psycholegal analysis is likely to point out
gaps in our understanding of the psychological and social realities supporting
legal and policy assumptions. Accordingly, psycholegal scholars set in motion the final stage of social analytic jurisprudence, which consists of researchers conducting carefully designed studies to probe, evaluate, and indeed, test the psychological models 2that others have not already applied to the
problems at hand in prior research.'
In the current article, we use social analytic jurisprudence to study one
of the assumptions that underlies the policy requirements of bankruptcy law.
8. Id. at511.
9. Id.; LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4042 (5th ed. 2002).
10. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence,supra note 4(4), at 511-512. "If psycholegal research is to be useful for adjudicative or legislative decision-making it
must begin with an accurate depiction of substantive legal doctrine." Id.
11. Id. at 512-14. "The second stage [of social analytic jurisprudence] consists of
a careful psychological analysis of the legal doctrine under investigation. Statutory
and common law, comprised of legal tests to be decided on the social facts induced in
specific cases, may often be framed in language that invites a social scientific analysis
and perhaps a psychological analysis." Id. at 512.
12. Id. at 514. "Upon determining that some area of substantive law is, at least in
principle, amenable to psychological analysis, the psycholegal scholar proceeds to
review the psychological literature and identify theories, research results and methodologies suitable for investigating the problem at hand." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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We believe the data that we present below show inconsistencies between
assumptions underlying BAPCPA and the way in which people are predisposed to use their credit cards. We developed a simulated, online credit card
purchasing analogue experiment to investigate some of these assumptions.
We present the results of our investigation in this article.

III. APPLICATION OF SOCIAL ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE TO
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW
As Figure 1 shows, non-business bankruptcy filings generally have risen
over the past twenty-five years, contributing to some commentators' concerns
about the general philosophy of bankruptcy relief. These concerns focus on
consumer debtors' motivations in borrowing and defaulting, contending that
the system creates incentives that motivate consumers to use the courts to
resolve problems that arise with their own overspending.13 There is a perception among some that consumers generally lack information about consumer
finance transactions, the consequences of default, and alternative options
available for resolving financial distress.' 4 Presumably, BAPCPA aims to
curb the increasing rate of consumer filings with new rules that both modify
the incentive structure and correct deficits in consumer knowledge about
credit.
Regarding the empirical findings that this article describes, we are concerned with the assumption that increasing consumer knowledge will lead to
13. See, e.g., Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means Test-

ing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 180 (arguing that increase in non-business bankruptcy
filings "has been significantly influenced," in part, "by changes in the law and legal
practice that have facilitated filing bankruptcy"); Eric A. Posner, Should Debtors Be
Forced Into Chapter 13?, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 965, 968 (1999) (discussing how
means testing might affect people's behavior relating to "(1) the purchase of credit,
(2) the decision to file for bankruptcy, and (3) the behavior during the pendency of a
Chapter 13 plan"); Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 205 (1998) (exploring explanations for why house-

holds don't file for bankruptcy more often; Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for
Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law
and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U. Cmu. L. REV. 685, 686 (1998) (arguing that unlim-

ited bankruptcy exemptions "gives too many households an incentive to file for bankruptcy rather than to take responsibility for repaying their debts.").
14. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments:
Debtor Education in H.R. 975, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer ProtectionAct
of 2003, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 425 (2004); Karen Gross, FinancialLiteracy Education:
Panacea,Palliative or Something Worse?, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1 (2005);
David A. Lander, It "Is" the Best of Times, It "Is" the Worst of Times: A Short Essay
on Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201 (2004); Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Financial Literacy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare, 8 N.C.
BANKING INST. 77 (2004); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and
Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233 (2002).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

5

1008

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

the wise use of credit. BAPCPA provides for increasing consumer information about credit card use in three different ways. First, credit card companies
must enhance their disclosure of minimum payment obligations and teaser
interest rates, as well as provide toll free telephone numbers for consumers to
use to obtain information about how long it will take to pay off their balances
by making only the minimum payment. 5 This regulation provides the point
of departure for the research results reported in this article. In addition,
BAPCPA conditions individuals' access to the bankruptcy system on receipt
of pre-bankruptcy counseling,' 6 and it requires consumer debtors to complete
an "instructional course concerning personal financial management."' 7 While
our earlier work 18 addressed these later considerations in increased knowledge assumptions, this article is concerned only with the possible effects of
the enhanced disclosure that BAPCPA demands of credit card creditors.
Disclosure requirements for creditors assume that consumers make deliberative financial decisions predicated largely on the consideration of the
economic consequences of alternatives. As rational actors, consumers make
self-serving choices based on the costs and benefits of a course of action.19
BAPCPA deviates slightly from a textbook model of the rational actor in that
it makes room for consumers' imperfect knowledge of credit card use consequences. In fact, the enhanced disclosure enactments aim to correct consumers who are ill-informed about the terms of their credit card contracts, including the effects of different types of repayment on the lives of their loans and
the total amount of money needed to repay the initial amount borrowed with
interest. In short, BAPCPA disclosure enhancement requirements are an effort to influence debtor decision making by providing debtors with accurate
information about the long-term effects of reliance on credit card loans.
This view of debtor decision making falls short because it does not consider the psychological reality of everyday people as they make choices about
what goods and services to buy, and what types of payment plans are best
suited to satisfy their appetitive needs and desires. While we do not challenge
the basic contribution that utility maximization can make to understanding
debtor choice, we do suggest that such an approach must be incomplete because it ignores the effects of psychological processes that are less deliberate
and more reactive in nature. In this article, we are specifically concerned with
conscious and subconscious processes arising from feelings, moods, and
emotions. We maintain that a more complete model of debtor and non-debtor
choice ought to include emotional reactions that people cannot escape as they
decide whether to make desired purchases. More specifically, we submit that
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b), (c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
17. Id. at § 727(a)(11).
18. Wiener et al., supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 210-215; White, Why It Pays,
supra note 13, at 689-90.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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the subjective weights (in the utility model sense of weights) used to reach
judgments about utility are themselves the product of affective psychological
constructs impacted by the totality of the circumstances (both internal and
external to the individual) that constitute the buying environment. 20 In the
end, any model of how consumers choose to spend and borrow money will be
incomplete and misunderstood to the extent to which it fails to take notice of
the psychological mechanisms - in this case emotion - that shape the utility maximizing procedures that consumers use in deciding whether to make
purchases with their credit cards.
Why do consumers use their credit cards to borrow more than rational
actors would? The purpose of this line of research is to examine some specific psychological processes that might provide an answer to that question
and at the same time examine the interaction of human judgment with some
of the enhanced credit card disclosure requirements adopted as part of
BAPCPA.
Two important psychological factors are candidates for causes of credit
card overuse. First, consumers may use credit cards unwisely because even
when they accurately anticipate the experience of their actions (i.e., the high
costs of overusing credit), they may fail to use the predicted experience to
guide their behavior.22 This failure of the cognitive system to direct conduct
may be the result of "hyperbolic time discounting ' 23 or impulsivity. 24 People
attach greater weight to immediate payoffs than to distant outcomes, even
when the cost of the distant outcomes is far greater than the immediate payoffs25 The immediate material payoff that results from the use of their credit

20. See Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotions and the Law: A Frameworkfor Inquiry, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (2006) (discussing in detail the way in which
emotion can influence the decision weights that make up decision processes in legally
relevant contexts and referring both to judgment processes using the lens model and
choice processes relying on utility maximization).
21. See Richard L. Wiener, Michael Holtje, Ryan Winter, Jason A. Cantone,
Susan Block-Lieb, and Karen Gross, Consumer Credit Card Use: The Roles of Creditor Disclosure and Anticipated Emotion, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: APPLIED
(forthcoming March 2007) (Containing the first report of the research collected within
this program of research. The authors look at the specific effects of anticipated emotion in the decision whether or not to use credit cards to make purchases and the ability of the enhanced disclosure rules called for in BAPCPA to moderate their anticipated emotional reactions.)
22. Christopher K. Hsee & Reid Hastie, Decision and Experience: Why Don't
We Choose What Makes Us Happy?, 10 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 1, 34 (2006).
23. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Addiction and Self-Control, in

169 (Jon Elster ed., 1999).
24. Hsee & Hastie, supra note 22, at 33-34.

ADDICTION: ENTRmIS AND EXSTS.

25. See Paul Slovic, Psychological Study of Human Judgment: Implicationsfor
Investment Decision Making, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKET 160-72 (2001) (for an

empirical analysis of cigarette smoking as a product of impulsivity).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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cards blinds consumers so that they weigh too little the long-term effects of
expensive revolving credit cards.
The issue is more complicated, however, because people are not always
accurate in predicting how they will experience outcomes. The failure to predict accurately the outcome of one's actions is the second psychological
process of importance. Consumers may "choose" to ignore the costs of longterm credit card use because the system allows them to avoid the "pain of
26
paying" which normally accompanies purchases of goods and services.
Normally, when people spend their money, they suffer the consequence of
not being able to use those funds for other products that they desire. However, the cost of foregoing other goods is a distant outcome, which loses some
of its impact through hyperbolic time discounting. Still, when people spend
their money directly -without the use of credit cards - the cost of giving up
their dollars may become associated with negative emotion: the pain of
spending. As a result, the emotional pain of spending (e.g., writing the check
or handing over dollars) is a natural limit, which people come to predict as an
outcome of their purchasing behavior. As Loewenstein and O'Donoghue
point out, the use of credit cards eliminates or, at least, puts off the emotional
pain of paying.27 In other words, people who use credit cards do not accurately predict the emotional cost of paying for the products or services, and,
therefore, the regulating effects of negative emotions do not play their usual
role in limiting purchasing behavior.
The recent BAPCPA amendments rely on a much less psychological approach to understanding consumer spending. Following the economic choice
model,28 BAPCPA assumes that with complete information people will act
rationally and avoid overspending when the costs of spending outweigh the
benefits of consumption. BAPCPA attempts to regulate consumption, in part,
by requiring creditors to enhance their customary disclosure of minimum
payment obligations and teaser interest rates, as well as by requiring toll-free
telephone numbers through which consumers could obtain more individualized information about how long it would take to pay off their balances making only minimum payments. 29 Under the tenets of the rational actor model,
26. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way
or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CI. L.

REv. 183, 196 (2006); Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black:
Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING Sci. 4 (1998).
27. Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 26, at 196.
28. See, e.g., id.; REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN
UNCERTAIN

WORLD: THE

PPSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND

DECISION MAKING

(2001); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralismand the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX.

L. REV. 1481 (2006); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.

REV. 1051 (2000); Wiener et al., supra note 5.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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providing consumers with more complete and individualized information
about their level of debt should discourage the use of credit card consumption
simply by making them aware of the costs of overusing their cards in the
form of high interest rates, compounded balances, and the lengthy payoff
periods that follow from payoff plans that rely on minimum payments.
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue describe this type of approach to regulation as "delayed demand deterrence," which motivates consumers by making
them aware of the delayed punishment for consuming in harmful ways (e.g.,
increased costs of interest compounded when people make only minimum
credit card payments). 30 Loewenstein and O'Donoghue question whether this
approach is likely to deter people's consumption because it requires consumers to weigh delayed consequences against more immediate ones. Further,
enhanced disclosure may inadvertently produce negative affects associated
with the immediate consequences of engaging in the negative conduct (e.g.,
fear and guilt). "Immediate demand deterrence" or the intentional use of "fear
appeals can and do often backfire because people respond to the fear not by
halting the undesired behavior, but by trying not to think about or pay attention to the threat." 31
If enhanced disclosure creates negative affects, people may engage in
mood repair; that is, they may seek more pleasurable stimuli to escape the
negative emotion that they experience from the fear and guilt induced by
enhanced disclosure. 32 In the current case, that may mean that people will
engage in more shopping to end bad moods. Some analogue psychological
investigations help operationalize the mood repair concept.
In one study, Raghunathan and Trope found that people who were exposed to both harmful and beneficial information about caffeine consumption
and who normally consumed large quantities of caffeine focused more on the
positive effects of caffeine consumption (to improve their moods) when they

30. Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 26, at 189.
31. Id. at 190 n.10.
32. Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Partner Choice: Role of Mood in
Social Decisions, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708 (1991); Jacqueline J.
Kacen, PhenomenologicalInsights in Mood and Mood-Related ConsumerBehaviors,
in 21 ADvANCEs IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 519 (1994); Gloria K. Manucia, Donald J.

Baumann & Robert B. Cialdini, Mood influences on Helping: Direct effects or Side
Effects?, 46 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357 (1984); David Glen Mick & Michelle Demoss, Self-gifts: Phenomenological Insights from Four Contexts, 17 J.
CONSUMER

RES. 322 (1990); William N. Morris & Nora P. Reilly, Toward the Self-

Regulation of Mood: Theory and Research, 11 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 215 (1987);

Dianne M. Tice, Ellen Bratslavsky & Roy F. Baumeister, Emotional DistressRegulation Takes Precedence Over Impulse Control: If You Feel Bad, Do It!, 80 J.
53 (2001); Doff Zillman, Mood Management: Using
Entertainment to Full Advantage, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND
AFFECT 147 (Lewis Donohew et al. eds., 1988).
PERSONALrrY & SOc. PSYCHOL.
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33
were induced to experience negative moods (as opposed to positive moods).
However, those participants who were low caffeine consumers showed increased attentiveness to all the information, not just the positive information.
This second group of participants engaged in attentive processing because the
task did not allow them to engage in mood repair. For them, focusing on the
positive aspects of caffeine consumption did not lead to positive affective
experiences because the negative caffeine information was not fear inducing
(i.e., they did not drink a lot of coffee, tea, or soda). Raghunathan and Trope
conclude that people in negative moods engage in mood repair only when the
task allows it. 34 Otherwise, they pursue attentive processing.
Extrapolating from these experiments, we anticipate that enhanced disclosure information may create negative mood states in consumers because
this type of information forces credit card holders to confront the possibility
of large balances, high interest rates, and lengthy payoff periods. These possibilities produce some level of distress, especially for people who have not
previously thought about these high payoff terms. Will these people engage in
mood repair actions? The literature is unclear. If enhanced disclosure produces negative mood states, then consumers may engage in mood repair activities, if such activities are available, and if the consumers believe that the
activities will decrease their feelings of negative affect. Several scholars have
collected correlational data to suggest that people sometimes (but not all the
time) engage in shopping behavior to escape bad moods. 35 Therefore, it follows that if enhanced disclosure does produce negative affect, people may
engage in more credit card buying to escape their negative moods. However,
it is also possible that negative moods will motivate attentive behavior or that
people will not believe mood repair is possible. The current research collected
mood data to begin to explore the relationships among enhanced disclosure,
affective responses, and credit card use.
We conducted an online field experiment to examine the effects of enhanced disclosure and self reported emotion on the credit card purchasing
behavior among people who filed petitions for bankruptcy relief in the prior
year (consumer debtors) and among people who had not done so (nondebtors). More specifically, we conducted this study to test the hypothesis
that enhanced disclosure would prevent consumer non-debtors and to a lesser
extent, consumer debtors from overusing their simulated credit cards. We
expected the emotional reactions toward enhanced disclosure information to
moderate the effects of enhanced disclosure on purchasing behavior.

33. Rajagophal Raghunathan & Yaacov Trope, Walking the Tightrope Between
Feeling Good and Being Accurate: Mood as a Resource in Processing Persuasive
Messages, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 513 (2002).
34. Id. at 522.
35. See Kacen, supra note 32; Wiener et al., supra note 5, at 466-67; Wiener et
al., supra note 22.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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IV. METHODS
We recruited research participants for our online analogue shopping experiment in several ways. First, we located debtors through PACER, the
online federal docket that lists all bankruptcy filers and their cases. We selected a random sample of filers from Nebraska and from the New York City
metropolitan area who had filed petitions in one of seven months prior to our
experiments. We mailed fliers to this group advertising the study and inviting
them to participate in an online study in exchange for a ten dollar stipend. We
also distributed fliers at the courthouse and with attorneys and bankruptcy
trustees. Finally, we recruited non-debtor participants through newspaper
advertisements in both the New York City and the Omaha and Lincoln, Nebraska communities. Interested flier recipients telephoned the laboratory and
left a name and telephone number. A researcher contacted each potential research participant, explained the study, and provided a password to interested
participants so that each could enter the study website on a computer of their
choice to complete the research task. Upon entering the website, the program
randomly assigned each participant to receive either current disclosure information or enhanced disclosure consistent with the requirements of BAPCPA.
Table 1 displays the demographic backgrounds of the 514 participants
who participated in and completed our online simulated shopping trip during
the period from June 2004 to August 2005.
Table 1: Demographic Information for Experiment 1 Participants
Variable
Filed for Bankruptcy Relief (490 reporting)
Yes
No
Bankruptcy Chapter (184 reporting)
Chapter 7
Chapter 13
Not Reported
Gender (493 reporting)
Male
Female
Residency (514 reporting)
Nebraska
New York
Currently Married (489 reporting)
Yes
No

n

%

193
297

39%
61%

146
16
5

75%
19%
6%

159
334

32%
68%

340
174

66%
34%

185
304

38%
62%

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Variable
Age' (489 reporting, Mean = 40)
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
Over 70
Education (497 reporting)
Less than high school
High school only
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate or professional degree
Ethnicity (492 reporting)
European American
African-American
Asian American
Hispanic
Other
Unemployed ever last year (488 reporting)
Yes
No
Student Status (492 reporting)
Full-time student
Part-time student
Non-student
Prior Year Family Income (474 reporting)
20,000 or less
21-30,000
31-40,000
41-50,000
51-60,000
61-70,000
71-80,000
81,000 or more

n

[Vol. 71

%

131
95
126
107
22
8

27%
19%
26%
22%
5%
2%

7
208
115
113
54

1%
42%
23%
23%
11%

350
58
35
4
40

71%
12%
7%
1%
8%

260
228

53%
58%

41
36
415

8%
7%
84%

135
97
73
49
42
27
13
25

28%
21%
15%
10%
9%
6%
3%
6%

The research materials in this study that appeared on the website included an informed consent statement, a disclosure information manipulation
(enhanced or unenhanced disclosure), a survey to measure emotions
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12

Wiener et al.: Wiener: Psychology and BAPCPA
2006]

PSYCHOLOGY AND BAPCPA

1015

(PANAS-X), 36 a simulated online shopping trip task, and a demographic
sheet.37 The simulated shopping trip emulated a common on-line shopping
experience, where consumers used a hypothetical "Goldwave" credit card to
make purchases. Prior to the shopping trip, the website displayed a general set
of instructions, describing the simulated shopping trip, and detailing how to
use the "Goldwave" credit card. It read (in part):
This survey will ask you to complete a task with which you are
very familiar. It will ask you to act as a consumer who is deciding
whether to buy several products. Please read the description of
each product and determine whether you would be willing to purchase the product using your credit card.... Use the same care that
you would when spending your own money using your own credit
card.
One-half of the participants received unenhanced disclosure information, which consisted of a credit card balance, the interest rate, and the minimum payment due, a prototype of the general information available to consumers prior to BAPCPA. The website told participants that they currently
held a credit card balance of $2,500, a limit of $8,000, and a fixed interest
rate of 14.5% annually.
The other half of the participants, those in the enhanced disclosure condition, viewed additional information that reflects full and individualized
disclosure information. Following the logic implied in BAPCPA, we reasoned that full and individualized disclosure would provide consumers with
complete information about their credit card loans and that such a disclosure
would have the greatest likelihood of moderating debtor's credit card use.
Participants received a clear and concisely written statement explaining how
many minimum payments they would need to make to pay off credit card
balances at increasing increments of $1,000.00 from $1,000.00 to $15,000.00,
how much principal they would pay, how much interest they would pay, and
an estimate of how many months would elapse before the balance reached
zero. The statement came in the form of a schedule (chart) and a narrative
description of each of the chart's elements (i.e., principal, balance, minimum
payment, interest, and interest plus principal).
Figure 2 displays a portion from the chart. Column one arranges balances from $1000 to $10,000 in increments of 1000 and column two is the
size of the minimum payment for each increment level per month. Columns
three through five present the total amounts that the debtor will pay out as36. David Watson et al., Development and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS-X Scales, 54 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1063 (1988).
37. The website also included an anticipated affect manipulation and an experienced emotion manipulation, but data analyses of these effects are presented elsewhere. See generally, supra note 38.
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suming that the debtor pays the minimum monthly payment each month. Column three shows the total interest that the debtor will pay during the life of

the loan to satisfy the financial obligation. Column four shows the total
amount that the debtor will expend in principal and interest to pay off the
loan, and column five displays the number of monthly payments (and years)
that the debtor will need to pay off the loan in full. In other words, for a
$10,000 loan at 14.5% fixed rate, one would need to make 201 monthly minimum payments (almost seventeen years) of $300 to pay of the loan. This
would cost the debtor $15,830, or $5,830 above the balance of $10,000, to
pay off the full amount.
Figure 2: Enhanced Disclosure Information Schedule
GOLDWAVE
Size of the
Total InTotal
Number of
Balance
Minimum
terest Paid
Amount
Months of
(Principal)
Monthly
Paid Out
Minimum
Payment
(Balance
Payments to
Plus the
Reach a
Interest)
Zero Balance
$1000
$30
$430
$1430
78 (6.6yrs)
$2000
$60
$1030
$3030
116 (9.7yrs)
$10,000

$300

$5830

$15830

201 (16.8yrs)

After viewing one of the two disclosure forms, each shopper completed
a short version of the PANAS, a standardized measure of currently experienced positive and negative affect. 38 The long form version of the PANAS,
which measures each dimension with ten positive and ten negative traits, has
shown strong psychometric properties in prior studies. 39 The PANAS-X short
form4° lists five positive (i.e., inspired, alert, excited, enthusiastic, and deter38. Watson et al., supra note 36, at 1063-70.
39. David Watson & Lee Anna Clark, The PANAS-X: Manual for the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule - Expanded Form (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on
file
with
The
University
of
Iowa),
available at
http://www.psychology.uiowa.edu/Faculty/Clark/PANAS-X.pdf.
40. Kyle Kercher, Assessing Subjective Well-Being in the Old-Old, 14 RES. ON
AGING 131 (1992). A. Mackinnon et al., A Short Form of the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule: Evaluation of Factorial Validity and Invariance Across Demographic Variables In a Community Sample, 27 PERSONALrTY AND INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 405-16 (1999); A short form of the Positive and Negative Affect

Schedule: Evaluation of factorial validity and invariance across demographic variables in a community sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 27(3), 405-416.

This study used confirmatory factor analysis to examine the psychometric properties
of the PANAS short form with a sample of 2,651 Australians from the Electoral Roll
for Canberra. Id. The resulting structural equation model showed two nearly orthogonal dimensions (one for negative affect and one for positive affect). Id. Each dimenhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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mined) and five negative feeling states (i.e., distressed, scared, nervous, upset, and afraid) and asks respondents to "rate the extent to which you feel this
way right now" on a one (very slightly or not at all) to five (extremely) scale.
The instrument produces two psychometrically sound measures of current
feelings: one scale measures positive affect and a second scale measures
negative affect that the respondent is experiencing at the time that she or he is
completing the rating scales.
After completing the PANAS-X short form, the participants engaged in
our online shopping task, which offered the participants ten items that they
could consider for purchase. The task for the respondents was to examine
each item and then rate the likelihood that they would buy that item with their
Goldwave credit card on a scale from 1 (very unlikely to buy) to 8 (very
likely to buy). The items appeared in random order, a different order for each
participant. First, all ten items appeared on the screen without description.
Then, each popped up, one at a time, with prices and descriptions and the
program asked the participants to rate the likelihood that they would make a
purchase for each item. The program presented the items for purchase, one at
a time in a different random order for each participant. Participants had as
much time as they needed to reach their decisions. The items (and their respective prices), were dinner out ($200), wine/liquor ($30), wristwatch
($400), business clothes ($300), vacation ($3,000), three CDs ($45), sofa
($800), bicycle ($450), laptop computer ($2,000) and movie tickets ($30).
The website kept a displayed record of which items that the participant had
already rated and which ones that the respondent had not rated. The participants continued until they had evaluated and rated each item.
At the conclusion of the shopping trip, the participants again completed
the PANAS-X short form (post shopping) and then finally answered a series
of demographic and financial questions that included items about their current
financial status, credit use, normal purchasing behavior, and knowledge of
credit card borrowing. We used the financial questions to test the relationships between results on our simulated shopping trip with the respondents'
self-reported financial status, credit use, and purchasing behavior. In addition,
we used the items about knowledge of credit card use to determine how much
participants know about borrowing and interest rates and to look at the relationship between our enhanced disclosure information and knowledge of
credit use.
More specifically, the demographic survey included five knowledge
questions about credit card borrowing. We wrote these five questions to sample representatively the content domain of the credit card use information in
our simulated shopping task. The five items that made up our knowledge
scale asked participants to use their own words to give definitions of the folsion showed high internal consistency reliability with coefficient alphas equal to .78
and .87, respectively. Id.
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lowing credit card concepts 1) minimum payment, 2) interest rate, 3) total
interest paid, 4) principal and 5) total amount paid. Three independent coders
analyzed three of the credit card borrowing questions from the demographic
survey (interest rate, total interest paid, and total amount paid) on scales ranging from 0 (wrong or missing answer) to 2 (completely correct answer) with 1
as a partially correct answer. The coders assigned for the other two definitions4 1(minimum payment and principal) either a 0 for incorrect or a 1 for correct.

Upon completion of the demographic and financial questions, participants read a debriefing statement and then supplied their names and addresses
so that the researchers could send them the stipends. The program stored the
consumers' responses to the rating scales and demographic questions in a
downloadable file, which we ultimately subjected to statistical analyses. The
website sent the names and addresses to a database maintained separately
from the experimental task data so that the researchers could not link any of
the answers to any of the questions to the participants' identifying information.
V. RESULTS

Purchasing Behavior. The simulated shopping trip yielded two measures of shopping. We calculated the first measure, the average likelihood-tobuy-rating (LB) by taking the average score across the 10 items to create an
index that could range from 1 (very slight likelihood-to-buy) to 8 (very high
likelihood-to-buy). The mean of the scale (with a midpoint of 5) was 3.16
(standard deviation [s.d.] = 1.30), suggesting that respondents were a little
reluctant to spend money across all items. However, this is not surprising
considering that the shopping trip included items with both high and low
price tags. 42 For the second measure, we calculated expected expenditures
(EE), by weighing the likelihood to buy the item by the cost of the item. That
is, we multiplied the cost of each item by the likelihood-to-buy-rating that
respondents supplied. This index could range from 690 to 55,169 and the
actual mean was 2,794 (s.d. = 1439.69). 43

41. Each coder independently rated a sample of 20 participants on each of the six
variables. Correlations between the coders for each question across the 20 participants
(point biserial correlations for dichotomous measures) ranged from a low of .65 (dichotomous factors) to a high of .89. Using Fisher's r to z transformation, the average
inter-rater correlation was r = .78. Inter-correlations for the 20 participants across all
three coders for the total scale (which could range from 0 to 8) were .90, .93, and .96.
42. The LB scale (for n = 514) produced a coefficient alpha equal to .77, demonstrating adequate internal consistency reliability and the data were normally distributed (skewness = .39 and kurtosis = .051).
43. The EE scale (for n = 514) was normally distributed (skewness = .58 and
kurtosis =.-34).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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Knowledge of Credit CardBorrowing. First, we calculated full knowl-

edge scale totals for the data across all the respondents. Scores ranged from a
low of 0 to a high of 8 with a mean of 3.4 (s.d. = 2.46). Our participants
scored significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale (X = 5) indicating
that they showed poor knowledge of credit card borrowing as used in this
study. 44
Next, we calculated correlations between the LB and EE measures with
the knowledge scale. According to the rational actor model, we expected participants who were more knowledgeable about credit card use and its high
costs to show signs of less purchasing behavior. However, the correlations
between the credit card knowledge scale and the LB and EE scales were nonsignificant (r = -.08, n = 484; and r = -.08, n = 484). Further we found that the

scores on the knowledge scale were not significantly different between the
enhanced disclosure participants and the unenhanced disclosure participants,
(M's = 3.56 and 3.31, respectively).4 5 While these results do not allow us to
accept the null hypothesis, they implicate directly our mediation hypothesis.
Therefore, if we find effects of disclosure on LB or EE we will be unable to
demonstrate the mediating effect of knowledge about credit card borrowing at
least as we measured that construct. In other words, these data do not support
a conclusion that the effects of enhanced disclosure inhibit the decision to
purchase via an increased knowledge route.
Simulated Shopping and Actual FinancialBehavior. Next, we examined

the relationship between the likelihood to purchase items on the online shopping trip and some measures of consumer conduct we collected on the demographic inventory to learn if people with different purchasing backgrounds
showed different patterns of behavior on our simulated shopping trip. First,
we asked, "Are people who spend more money on our simulated shopping
trip likely to be consumers who normally use credit cards?" Figure 3 shows
that respondents who reported that they possessed no credit cards on our
demographic measure were significantly less likely to purchase items with
their Goldwave credit cards on our online shopping trip. 46 Figure 4 illustrates
respondents with unpaid bills from the previous month were more likely to
spend money on our shopping trip compared to those without unpaid bills.47
Similarly, those responders who reported that they had planned budgets but
failed to use them were more likely to buy than were those who reported that
they managed to stick to their planned budgets.48

44. The 95th percent confidence interval for the knowledge scale (CI: 3.22, 3.66)
did not contain the midpoint (X = 5), demonstrating that the actual knowledge mean
was significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale (p < .05).
45. t(482) = 1.08, ns.
46. t(466) = 2.33, p < .02; ni(no cards) = 131, n2( or more cards) = 337.
47. t(484) = 3.14, p < .01; nl(with unpaid bills) = 193, n2(no unpaid bills) = 293.
48. t(262) = 2.46, p < .025; ni(followed budget) = 148, n2(failed to follow
budget) = 116.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Figure 3: Likelihood of Using the Goldwave Card (Means)
as a Function of the Number of Self-reported Credit Cards

No Cards

One or More Cards

Figure 4: Unpaid Bills, Use of a Planned Budget, and
Likelihood of Using the Goldwave Card (Means)

0

&1

4,4,,

Finally, we asked responders on the demographic instrument to indicate
whether they borrowed money in the prior month, and if they did from which
sources they borrowed the money (bank loan, payday loan, pawn broker,
home equity loan, finance company loan, credit union loan, mortgage loan,
credit card loan, or and equity loan). We found a significant correlation (r =
.12, p < .025, n = 514) between the number of sources from which responhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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dents borrowed and the likelihood that they use the Goldwave card to make
purchases. In other words, the more sources they checked, the greater was the
likelihood that consumers would spend money on our simulated shopping
trip.
In summary, these results show that online shoppers were more likely to
purchase with their cards if they had multiple real credit cards of their own,
they had unpaid bills from the previous month, they failed to follow their own
planned budgets, or if they borrowed money from multiple sources. These
results suggest that our simulated credit card task is associated with at least
some forms of unwise use of money and credit.
EnhancedDisclosure and Debtor Status.4 9 Next, we examined in detail
the effects of enhanced disclosure, debtor status, and place of residence (New
York vs. Nebraska) on the two measures of consumers using their Goldwave
credit cards to purchase items on our online shopping trip. The first analysis
examined whether or not there were differences among debtors and nondebtors with and without enhanced disclosure, and whether any differences
50
generalized to responders living in the two different geographic locations.
As depicted in Figure 5, we found that enhanced disclosure lowered the likelihood of consumers to purchase items on our shopping trip, when the aggregated ratings did not include the prices of the items in the index (i.e., the LB
measure described above). Those with the enhanced disclosure charts, regardless of state of residence, were less likely to use their Goldwave Cards overall. We also found, as would be expected, that the New Yorkers (accustomed
to paying higher prices for merchandise overall) were more liberal in their
spending than were the Nebraskan respondents. We found no differences
between debtors and non-debtors.

49. Before conducting the analyses that follow, we examined the effects of respondent gender on LB and EE and found no main effects or interactions of gender
with any of the factors of interest. As a result of these analyses, we dropped gender
from the remaining analyses reported in this article.
50. A 2 (status: debtor vs. non-debtor) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced)
x 2 (residence: Nebraska vs. New York) between groups analysis of variance on LB
produced a main effect for disclosure, F(1,506) = 3.91, MSE = 1.62, p < .05, and a
main effect for residence, F(1,506) = 3.88, p < .05. The effect. for debtor status was
not significant, F(1,506) = 2.89, ns. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Figure 5: The Effects of Type of Disclosure, Respondent
Residence, and Likelihood of Using the Goldwave Card (Means)
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We repeated these same analyses using expected expenditures (i.e., E.E.
- which included the price of the items in the scale as described above) as the
outcome measure and found very similar results as shown in Figure 6. Again,
enhanced disclosure produced lower expected expenditures and New York
residence was associated with higher expected expenditures. Again, there was
51
no statistically significant difference between debtors and non-debtors.

51. A 2 (status: debtor vs. non-debtor) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced)
x 2 (residence: Nebraska vs. New York) between groups analysis of variance on EE
produced a marginal main effect for disclosure, F(1,506) = 3.64, MSE = 2033092.004,
p < .06, and a marginal main effect for residence, F(1,506) = 3.41, p < .07. The effect
for debtor status was not significant, F(1,506) = .55, ns. No other main effects or
interactions were significant.
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Figure 6: The Effects of Type of Disclosure, Respondent Residence, and Expected
Expenditures (likelihood x item prices, averaged) (Means)
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Enhanced Disclosure and Shopping to End Bad Moods. One of the
questions on our demographic questionnaire asked respondents whether they
did or did not shop in order to end bad moods. The mood repair hypothesis
developed above would suggest that those respondents who typically shop to
escape bad moods might spend more money on our online shopping trip. To
test this out we examined the interactive effect of type of disclosure and
whether or not people typically shop to end bad moods on the likelihood to
buy measure. 52 The results showed those respondents who self-reported that
they shop to end bad moods were more likely to use their Goldwave credit
cards to purchase items on our online shopping trip (M=3.70) as compared to
those who did not shop to end bad moods (M = 2.90). However, more importantly the effect of enhanced disclosure on inhibiting likelihood to buy was
different among those participants who did and did not shop to end a bad
mood. Figure 7 illustrates the effects. Analyses showed that for participants
who reported shopping to end a bad mood, the effect of type of disclosure
52. A 2 (shop to end bad mood: yes vs. no) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced) between groups analysis of variance on LB produced a main effect for mood,
F(1,477) = 58.19, MSE = 1.46, p < .01, and an interaction effect between mood and
type of disclosure, F(1,477) = 5.35, p < .06. Follow-up simple effects showed that the
effect of type of disclosure was significant for those who do not shop to end a bad
mood, F(1,477) = 5.33, p < .025, but not for those who do shop to end a bad mood,
F(1,477) = .64, ns. Examining the means within disclosure conditions, the effects of
mood were significant in the enhanced disclosure condition, F(1,477) = 34.90, p < .01
and in the unenhanced condition, F(1,477) = 9.38, p < .01. No other main effects or
interactions were significant.
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was not statistically significant. Only for those respondents who did not report that they shopped to end a bad mood were the effects of enhanced disclosure significant. That is, those with enhanced disclosure information were less
likely to use their Goldwave credit cards to make purchases only if they did
not shop to end a bad mood. Examining the effects of shopping to end a bad
mood within each type of disclosure information, we find that those who report that they do shop to end bad moods are more likely to make purchases
with their Goldwave credit cards under both types of disclosure conditions.

Figure 7: The Effects of Type of Disclosure and Shopping to End a Bad
Mood on Likelihood to Buy
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The same analyses on the Expected Expenditure data produced very
similar effects as shown in Figure 8. 53 Similar to Figure 7, those who selfreported that they shop to end bad moods showed higher expected expenditures (M = 3203.79) as compared to those who did not shop to end bad moods
(M = 2635.91). Again, the effect of enhanced disclosure on credit card purchasing behavior was different among those participants who did and did not
53. A 2 (shop to end bad mood: yes vs. no) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced) between groups analysis of variance on EE produced a main effect for mood,
F(1,477) = 16.12, MSE = 1963179.13, p < .01, and an interaction effect between

mood and type of disclosure, F(1,477) = 4.18, p < .05. Follow-up simple effects
showed that the effect of type of disclosure was significant for those who do not shop
to end a bad mood, F(1,477) = 7.60, p < .01, but not for those who do shop to end a
bad mood, F(1,477) = .45, ns. Examining the means within disclosure conditions, the
effects of mood were significant in the enhanced disclosure condition, F(1,477) =
18.93, p < .001, but not in the unenhanced condition, F(1,477) = 1.88, ns. No other
main effects or interactions were significant.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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shop to end a bad mood. Analyses showed that for participants who reported
shopping to end a bad mood, the effect of type of disclosure was not statistically significant, but for those who did not report that they shopped to end a
bad mood, the effects of enhanced disclosure were significant in the expected
direction. For this latter group of participants, those with enhanced disclosure
showed lower expected expenditures as compared to those without enhanced
disclosure.
Taking apart this interaction from the opposite direction, we found no
difference on expected expenditures between responders who do and those
who do not shop to end bad moods in the unenhanced disclosure condition.
However, for consumers who received enhanced disclosure, those who shop
to end a bad mood demonstrated higher expected expenditures than did those
who did not shop for that purpose. Thus, enhanced disclosure facilitated differences between consumers who do and those who do not shop to end a bad
mood. This unintended effect of enhanced disclosure is a boomerang effect in
that it actually augments the differences in purchasing between those who
report that they shop to end a bad mood and those who shop for other reasons.
We turn to analyses of direct mood comparisons using the PANAS-X measures to help understand why this effect seems to work in this unexpected direction.
Figure 8: The Effects of Type of Disclosure and Shopping to End a Bad
Mood on Expected Expenditures (Means)
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Positive and Negative Feelings During the Shopping Trip. Recall that

participants completed the PANAS-X short form with 5 negative feeling adjectives and 5 positive feeling adjectives after reviewing the disclosure information, before shopping with their Goldwave credit cards and again after
shopping with their cards. We summed the positive and negative adjective
rating scales separately to create separate positive and negative emotion
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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scales before and after shopping. 54 We examined the effects of type of disclosure, debtor status, residence of respondent, and time of mood administration on male and female respondents' scores on the positive and negative feeling scales. First for positive mood, we found a statistically significant increase in positive mood from the pre-shopping measure (M = 2.72) to
the post-shopping measure (M = 2.86). No other effects were significant for
positive feelings as an outcome measure.55 For negative mood, there was
also an impact of time of administration of the PANAS feeling scales such
that negative feelings decreased from before shopping (M = 1.78) to after
shopping (M = 1.60). 56 However, Figure 9 and the statistical analyses show

54. We averaged across the five ratings of positive feelings (1 to 5) pre-shopping
to produce a positive feeling scale (coefficient alpha internal consistency reliability
equaled .75, M = 2.69 , s.d. = .86, n = 514) for the first administration and did the

same post-shopping for the second administration (alpha = .80, M = 2.86, s.d. = .97, n
= 504). Following this same method (but averaging across the negative feeling ratings) we created a negative feeling scale prior to shopping (coefficient alpha = .90, M
=1.88, s.d. =.99, n = 514) and one post shopping (alpha = 89, M = 1.62 , s.d. = .83, n

-504).
55. A 2 (debtor status: debtor vs. non-debtor) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced) x 2 (Residence: New York vs. Nebraska) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (time of
PANAS administration: before vs. after shopping) mixed analysis of variance with
repeated measures on the last factor produced only a significant main effect of time
administration on positive (PANAS) feelings, F(1, 496) = 10.31, p < .001. No other
main effects or interactions were significant. This analysis and the one that examined
negative feelings included gender because there are some indications in the literature
that gender influences PANAS scores. It did not do so in this analysis.
56. A 2 (debtor status: debtor vs. non-debtor) x 2 (disclosure: enhanced vs. unenhanced) x 2 (Residence: New York vs. Nebraska) x 2 (Gender) x 2 (time of
PANAS administration: before vs. after shopping) mixed analysis of variance with
repeated measures on the last factor produced a significant main effect of time administration on negative (PANAS) feelings, F(1, 477) = 10.31, MSE = .41, p < .01.
However, this effect was qualified by an interaction between the time of administration and type of disclosure, F(I, 477) = 6.86, p < .025. Simple effects tests showed
that the enhanced disclosure chart produced a significant effect on negative feelings
only before shopping, F(1,477) = 6.49, p < .01, but that the effect faded away after
shopping, F(1,477) = .00, ns. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
Some other interactions that are less important to the main theses of this
article resulted from this analysis of negative affect. First, there was a significant
interaction between time of administration and gender of the respondent, F(1,477) =
6.76, p < .025. Simple effect tests showed that decreases in negative feelings in
women participants from pre-shopping (M = 1.87) to post-shopping (M = 1.54), F(1,
477) = 25.88, p < .025, but not in men, F(1,477) = .04, ns. Finally, there was a significant interaction between the debtor status and participant residence, F(1,477) = 4.62,
MSE = 1.15, p < .05. Simple effect tests showed that collapsed across administration
of the PANAS, Nebraska non-debtors showed more negative feelings (M = 1.80) as
compared to New York non-debtors ( M = 1.60), F(1,477) = 4.98, p < .05. The same
effect was not significant in debtors, F(1,477) = 1.60, ns.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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Figure 9: The Effects of Shopping and Disclosure on Negative Affect
Measured by the PANAS (Means)
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that participants who read the enhanced disclosure information showed increased negative feelings as a result of reading the enhanced disclosure which
explained some of the detrimental outcomes of unwise credit card use. Interestingly these negative feelings decreased significantly after the shopping trip
to reach the same level as the negative feelings among those with unenhanced
disclosure information both before and after shopping. These data seem to
suggest that the enhanced disclosure increased negative mood relative to unenhanced disclosure and that shopping increased positive mood for all participants regardless of the type of disclosure they viewed.
It is possible that enhanced disclosure among those people who shop to
end a bad mood led to negative affect, which in turn resulted in increased
shopping and expected expenditures. This would be a classic mood repair
effect, suggesting that those who shop to end a bad mood responded to the
negative moods produced by enhanced disclosure with additional shopping,
which resulted in a decrease in negative mood. If this is true, the enhanced
disclosure boomerang for expected expenditures, which augmented differences between those who shop to end bad moods and those who do not, may
be due to the impact of enhanced disclosure on mood states. That is, it puts
shoppers into bad moods in the first place, which they attenuate by using their
credit cards even more. In the end, this increased buying decreases the negative mood state. To determine if this was a possibility, we conducted some
mediation analyses following Baron and Kenny's procedure.57 Accordingly,
if negative mood mediates the interaction of type of disclosure and shopping
to end a bad mood on expected expenditures, then the interaction term in a
regression model should predict both expected expenditures after shopping
57. Reuben M. Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical
Considerations,51 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1173 (1985).
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and negative mood before shopping. However, the effect of the interaction on
expected expenditures should drop out when we control for negative mood
before shopping. (Note: variable x moderates the effects of variable y on outcome z, if variable y influences z differently at unique values of x. Variable x
mediates the relationship between variable y and z, if y causes x, which in
turn causes z. Therefore, while we have shown that shopping to end a bad
mood does moderate the effects of enhanced disclosure on expected expenditures, we have not yet established that experienced emotion mediates the effects of enhanced disclosure on expected expenditures.)
Figure 10 displays the results of the linear regressions (it shows standardized beta weights) using the interaction of type of disclosure with shopping to end a bad mood (disclosure x shopping to end a bad mood) to predict
expected expenditures. It also displays the relationship between the interaction (disclosure x shopping to end a bad mood) and negative mood before
shopping, as well as the relationship between negative mood before shopping
and expected expenditures. Finally, Figure 10 displays in parentheses, the
relationship between the disclosure x shopping interaction and expected expenditures (controlling for negative mood before shopping).58'59
In these analyses, the interaction of type of disclosure and shopping to
end a negative mood did predict the Goldwave credit card expected expenditures. Further, there were marginally significant links between the interaction
and negative moods at time 1 and for negative moods at time 1 with expected
expenditures. However, the interaction of disclosure x mood on expected
expenditures did not attenuate when the regression equation controlled for
negative moods at time 1. Therefore, there is no evidence that mood repair is
responsible for the boomerang effect (i.e., enhanced disclosure facilitating the
differences in purchasing between those who shop to end a bad mood and
those who do not).

58. For the criterion variable negative affect at time 1, a linear regression analysis that included as a dummy coded predictor disclosure information and the interaction of disclosure and shopping to end a bad mood produced a marginally significant
model, F(1,490) = 3.22, p < .07. The standardized regression weight for the interaction (fl) was .08. For the criterion variable expected expenditures, a linear regression
analysis that included as a dummy coded predictor disclosure information and the
interaction of disclosure and shopping to end a bad mood produced a significant
model, F(1,490) = 9.78, R = .14, p < .01. The standardized regression weight for the
interaction (fl) was .14.
59. For the criterion variable expected expenditures, a linear regression analysis
that included as a dummy coded predictor disclosure information and the interaction
of disclosure and shopping to end a bad mood and negative mood at time 1 produced
an overall significant model, F(2,489) = 6.28, R = .16, p < .01. The Standardized
regression weight for the interaction of type of disclosure and shopping to end a bad
mood (f#= .15, p < .001) was significant and the standardized regression weight for
negative affect was marginally significant (8 = -.07, p < 10).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/8
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Figure 10: Predicting Expected Expenditures
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analogue experiment that we developed had several positive outcomes. First, it provided reliable measures of the likelihood of consumers to
make ostensible purchases with simulated credit cards and the expected
amount of money that they would spend. We are encouraged that we have
been able to sample successfully over 500 respondents and that they were
able to complete our online shopping trip and provide us with a rich data set
to evaluate. One advantage of this approach (as compared to laboratory research or mailed surveys) is that it allowed us to collect conveniently a diverse sample of respondents from geographic areas that sampled very different communities. The demographic data that we collected showed that we
were indeed able to collect data from a diverse sample of debtors and nondebtors from New York and Nebraska. As a result, we are able to generalize
our results across a heterogeneous population.
The rational actor model 60 makes the testable assumption that consumers will choose not to overspend with credit cards to the extent that they possess knowledge about the effects of high interest rates, minimum payments,
and long term loan agreements on the amount of money they pay to satisfy
60. See HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 28; Block-Lieb & Janger supra note 28;
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28; Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 26, at 18587; Wiener et al., supra note 5, at 459-60.
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their credit card loans. Our data show that debtors and non-debtors possessed
poor knowledge of these issues (the mean number of test items answered
correctly was less than the midpoint values on our scale). Further, the correlation between knowledge scores on our scale and the likelihood that consumers purchased items on our online shopping expedition were very small and
non-significant, as were the correlations between this same index and expected expenditures. This challenges the underlying BAPCPA assumption
that with more information about credit loans, consumers will modify their
purchasing behavior and resist the pressures to overuse their credit cards to
buy desired products and services.
Perhaps our respondents' level of knowledge about credit card loans did
not reach the threshold that is required to influence purchasing behavior. It
could be that with more education, debtors and non-debtors would gain
enough information to modify their behavior. However, we designed our
enhanced disclosure information to provide maximum information to consumers, more than may be required by BAPCPA, yet respondents who reviewed our enhanced disclosure charts and summaries showed knowledge
scores that were not significantly different from those who read the unenhanced information. Still, some of our earlier work demonstrated that financial literacy training can significantly increase knowledge about credit and
finance. 61 Different methods of conveying enhanced disclosure may be more
successful than our current approach. More specifically, it is possible that
people who actively call their creditors for the type of information we provided will pay more attention to it than did participants in our study.
BAPCPA, when fully enacted, will require that creditors make this type of
call-in service available. Still, our results should bring some pause to those
who firmly believe that enhanced disclosure will automatically curb use of
credit cards to make desired purchases.
However, this finding is only useful if our simulated shopping trip results correlate with actual financial behavior. To this end, we looked at the
relationship between purchasing behavior on our simulated shopping trip and
self-reported financial data. We found that online shoppers were more likely
to purchase with their cards if they had multiple real credit cards of their own,
if they had unpaid bills from the previous month, if they failed to follow their
own planned budgets, or if they borrowed money from multiple sources.
These results suggest that our simulated credit card task is associated with at
least some forms of unwise use of money and credit.
While the main analyses found no significant differences between debtors and non-debtors on either likelihood to buy or expected expenditures, they
did show enhanced disclosure effects. Those consumers with enhanced disclosure (as compared to those without) were less likely to buy products and
showed lower expected expenditures. Unsurprisingly, New Yorkers (com61. Richard L. Wiener et al., Debtor Education, FinancialLiteracy, and Pending
Bankruptcy Legislation, 23 BEHAv. Sci & L. 347 (2005).
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pared to Nebraskans) were more likely to use their Goldwave cards to purchase products and services. However, whether or not people professed to
shop to end bad moods moderated the effects of enhanced disclosure in a
troublesome way. First, individuals who claimed to shop to end bad moods
were more likely to buy and had greater expected expenditures. Most importantly, enhanced disclosure failed to limit credit card use among those respondents who claimed that they shopped to end bad moods. Further, we
found a boomerang effect of enhanced disclosure in that it augmented the
differences in purchasing among those who shop to end a bad mood and those
who do not. Specifically, those who shopped to end a bad mood displayed
higher expected expenditures than did those who did not shop to end a bad
mood, but only in the enhanced disclosure condition. 62 That is, the difference
in the expected expenditure means of the bad mood and non-bad mood shoppers were only statistically significant in the enhanced disclosure condition. It
is worth noting that those people who shop to end bad moods are likely the
ones who could benefit the most from a form of disclosure that they could use
to inform their purchasing behavior. In the end, these results may signal a
missed opportunity in the new regulations.
While it is difficult to explain these effects, we did make some headway.
We found that respondents' positive moods increased from measures taken
immediately after they read enhanced disclosure information (before shopping) to the end of the shopping trip. Further, enhanced disclosure produced
increases in negative affect prior to shopping, but this negative affect decreased after shopping. However, to our surprise, the effect of enhanced disclosure on expected expenditures among those who shop to end a bad mood
was not mediated by negative feeling ratings on the PANAS so that any mood
repair effects that occurred did not produce greater use of the Goldwave
credit card.
It may be that those individuals who report that they shop to end a bad
mood did endeavor to decrease negative affect in this study by using their
Goldwave Card to make purchases. However, because our exercise results in
the acquisition of no actual goods or services and no actual bills, the connection between enhanced disclosure and expected expenditures is direct and
does not rest on experienced negative mood. More specifically, because of
the simulated nature of the shopping trip, the mere act of rating any or all of
the items as having a high likelihood-to-buy decreased negative moods below
the initial pre-shopping rating. As a result, our measure of decreased negative
affect was not sensitive enough to pick up the effects of enhanced disclosure
in the sub sample of respondents who shopped to end a bad mood. Therefore,
the effect of the interaction between type of disclosure and shopping to end a
bad mood remained significant after controlling for the negative PANAS-X
mood effect before shopping.

62. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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We are left with a moderating effect for enhanced disclosure. It does
have a moderate size impact, decreasing credit card purchasing among individuals who do not shop to end bad moods. However, for those individuals
who self-report that they do shop to control their moods, enhanced disclosure
becomes another reason to buy more. These results support the Loewenstein
and O'Donoghue (2006) argument that "delayed demand deterrence" produces increases in fear and anxiety without commensurate increases in com63
pliance to the intended regulation. In other words, making consumers aware
of the delayed punishment for consuming in harmful ways (i.e., increased
costs of compounded interest when people make only minimum credit card
payments) may create fear and anxiety that offset any small gains obtained in
the wise use of money. In our experiment, those who admittedly shop to end
bad moods failed to gain much new knowledge from their exposure to enhanced disclosure information, but they did experience the affective "pain"
that comes with that increased knowledge. Most importantly, these individuals wound up using their credit cards as much and spent as much money as
did those without enhanced disclosure charts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

We started out with a discussion of social analytic jurisprudence suggesting that there is value in addressing identified assumptions made in the
law and testing them with empirical data.64 This article has done just that with
BAPCPA. Because it follows a rational actor model, the law assumes that
disclosing more information will act as an antidote for consumer's unwise use
of credit card loans. While we found some evidence to support this assumption in our experiment, we found other results that require major qualifications in defense of the assumption. Increases in credit card loan knowledge
did not lead to curbed use of credit, and enhanced disclosure did not increase
loan knowledge. However, enhanced disclosure did increase negative affect,
and it did not decrease buying for people who shop to end a bad mood. Individuals who bought more on our simulated shopping trip experienced a decrease in their negative affect over the course of the shopping expedition.
While we were unable to pinpoint negative affect due to enhancement as
the mediator for the negative effects of enhanced disclosure in consumers
who shop to control their bad moods, those negative effects were nonetheless
pronounced in our data. Our results point to the likelihood that the effectiveness of increased knowledge as an antidote for unwise use of consumer credit
cards may involve a great deal more than simply enhancing credit card statement disclosures. At the very least, our data suggest that researchers might do
well to take into consideration psychological factors in examining the efficacy of credit card disclosure rules in regulating the demand side of credit
63. Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 26, at 189.
64. Wiener et al., supra note 5.
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card over-expenditures. This is especially true because the information that
we presented to consumers was more complete than the minimum required
disclosure under BAPCPA and the amendments (not yet in force) to the Truth
in Lending Act.
Finally, a conclusion about the role of emotion in moderating and mediating the effects of reforms to credit card disclosure requirements awaits further research from experiments that use different forms of disclosure information presented in different formats (i.e., made available over the telephone as
required in BAPCPA or automatic systems in which consumers enter their
personalized data after more general hypothetical repayment examples) and
from field studies that replicate our results. Certainly, it would be unwise to
draw general inferences from one analogue study without replication in real
world contexts. The study reported in this article is an experimental analogue
for people engaged in credit card shopping. The chief difference between our
methodology and real world shopping is that our participants were in the enviable position of not owing any money after completing the experiment, but
in the unenviable position of not owning any new products or services after
shopping.
Still, the current work raises the importance of factors such as experienced emotion as explaining unwise use of credit cards among consumers.
The data collected from our online shopping trip suggest that unwise credit
card use is a difficult problem for the bankruptcy system to address and that it
will require an interdisciplinary effort to resolve. In the end, we have only
begun to examine the effects of experienced emotion on credit use under
BAPCPA. However, we invite other researchers who are interested in this
issue to take notice of the results of rational actor model theories, as well as
research that emphasizes the role of more psychological factors in the wise
use of credit.
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